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Introduction
A recent paper (Hall and Murphy, 2000) concentrates on the value and the opportunity cost of options granted to employees. The question arises since it has become widely common for employees, mostly executives, to receive options which are not tradable up to a certain date and for which no action can be taken to hedge against risk, such as short selling the underlying stock. The rationale of these limitations hinges upon the incentive to work that the options are meant to provide as long as they are held by employees. Non tradability implies that the risk contained in the underlying asset and, consequently, in the option, cannot be diversi…ed away.
It is maintained that …rms granting non tradable options face an opportunity cost that is larger than the bene…t, i.e. the value, employees get. If this gap really existed a deadweight loss should result and ine¢ciency in the incentive mechanism based on stock options would appear. The gap, supposedly, arises since "the opportunity cost of granting an option to employees is the amount the company could have received if it were to sell the option to an outside investor... who is generally free to trade the option or take action such as short selling" (Hall and Murphy, 2000, p.210 ). Since employees cannot diversify away the risk, they place on the stock options less value than outside investors. However, through their e¤ort they increase the market price of the stock by an amount that may be larger or smaller than the gap due to the risk premium arising from forbidden trade.
As a matter of fact, tradable options are never given to employees, since …rms grant nontradable options whose value may be lower or higher than the value of corresponding tradable options according to the e¤ort stock options are able to stimulate. As a result the incentive mechanism may lead either to a Pareto superior outcome or give rise to a deadweight loss whenever the valuation of granted options di¤ers between employees and shareholders.
We concentrate on a rational employee who provides the e¤ort that increases the value of the stock, without a¤ecting the idiosyncratic risk of the …rm, i.e. the risk he is not allowed to diversify away once he has been granted the stock option with limited tradability 1 . We then go through the opportunity cost of stock options according to the e¤ectiveness of the incentive mechanism.
In the next section we use a binomial model to evaluate the opportunity cost of nontradable options granted to employees. In section 3 we derive some results concerning the incentive scheme embodied in the stock option. In section 4 we consider an example of a non neutral e¤ort. In section 5 conclusions are drawn.
2 The shareholders' opportunity cost in a simple binomial model
Suppose, for instance, that, on January 1, 2001, a company grants its employees, as an incentive device, an option that is tradable only in one year, i.e. from January 1, 2002 . This option is the basis of a compensation mechansim to induce "pro…t-performance" 2 . Therefore, its market value (and the opportunity cost for the writer) is not equal to the value of the corresponding wholly tradable option issued at the same date.
To see why, let us de…ne the value of the wholly tradable option at time zero, when it is issued and sold in the market, as F 0 : In a simple two-period framework, the value of the corresponding nontradable option for the writer is given by the "pro…t-performance" he gets. While for the holder, assuming away for simplicity non option wealth and risk aversion, it is equal to the "expectation" on January 1, 2001 of the value that will take the corresponding tradable option on January 1, 2002, minus the "cost of his e¤ort". In other words, there need to be no coincidence of the return on granted options with respect to the equilibrium return required by outside investors on an equivalent-risk traded stock 3 . The above assertion can be made more precise in a two-period binomial model. To this purpose, let us consider a non dividend-paying asset whose returns, at time one, are:
2 Using the terminology of Murphy (2001) .
where u > 1; d < 1; and, to eliminate arbitrage opportunities, u > 1 + r > d; with r as the riskless rate. Moreover, let us consider an European call option written on (1). Its value over the period is equal to:
where F 
Shareholders and outside investors
Consider a shareholder who holds the asset (1), writes the European call (2) with the exercise price K and sells it to an outside investor. His wealth at time zero is:
where F 0 is the price of the call (2) sold to the outside investor. After one period the shareholder's wealth becomes:
In words: with probability q the asset goes up to S + 1 = uS 0 : The option is exercised by the investor and the writer loses (S + 1 ¡ K): With probability 1 ¡ q the asset falls to S ¡ 1 = dS 0 and the call option is not exercised. Yet, the shareholder gets (1 + r)F 0 if he has invested in a riskless asset the amount F 0 cashed at time zero. If we assume that the asset S 0 does not pay any dividend, the expected gain from holding V 0 is equal to
or, by substitution,
Sharedolders and employees
So far we have neglected that shareholders give the stock option to employees as an incentive device. This is why the option must be nontradable for a certain time. While there would be no reason to do so if the option were just an ex post compensation. In our two-period framework, non tradability implies that employees have no right to sell or exercise before time one. Let's assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the employees' e¤ort increases pro…ts between zero and one, while leaving unchanged the probability distribution of the asset returns at time one 4 . Then, the incentive device can be represented rewriting the shareholders' wealth (4) as:
As the employee gets the option for free the shareholders' wealth at zero is given by the value of the stock plus the "cost of the e¤ort", i.e. the discounted "pro…t-performance" induced by the incentive I 0 = ½I 1 ; with ½ = 1 1+r
. At time one the shareholders receive the increment of pro…t I 1 plus the realization of S; i.e. with probability q the stock goes up to S + 1 and the option is exercised, while with probability 1 ¡ q the stock falls to S ¡ 1 and the option goes underwater 5 . Then, the shareholders' expected gain is:
Rational shareholders grant the stock option only if ¢ ¤¤¸0 : The opportunity cost of this decision is the value of the best foregone alternative, i.e. ¢ ¤ . Shareholders may gain or lose by granting a nontradable stock option to employees rather than selling a corresponding tradable option to outside investors, i.e.:
may be zero, negative or positive.
3 The value of the stock option as an incentive device
Now we go through the sign of the di¤erence ¢ ¤¤ ¡ ¢ ¤ , by evaluating the European call F 0 vis à vis the "pro…t-performance" value I 0 :
Consider …rst the European call F 0 : The shareholder and the outside investor would agree to use the standard methodology (Ingersoll, 1987 , ch. 14) for pricing it, by setting up a portfolio composed by the call and short sales of N shares of the asset at the current price S 0 ; i.e.:
After one period the value of the portfolio is:
with probability
For the portfolio to provide the same return, regardless of the state, we choose N to satisfy ©
Since this portfolio at time 1 is risk free and the asset does not pay out any dividend, the return from holding it equals the capital gain © 1 ¡ © 0 ; and, to avoid arbitrage, © 1 ¡ © 0 = r© 0 : Solving for the two unknowns, N and F 0 , we obtain:
with:
where p is the "risk-neutralized probability", that would prevail in a riskneutral environment in which the actual return rate qu + (1 ¡ q)d is replaced by a certainty-equivalent or risk-neutral rate pu + (1 ¡ p)d:
3.1 An example where the compensation mechansim does not change the distribution of S:
If shareholders grant the stock option to employees as an incentive device, the option becomes a compensation to induce employees "pro…t-performance". In this case a di¤erent pricing rule is needed to take into account the tradeo¤ between the stock option received by workers and the related "pro…t-performance". Recalling that we have assumed away non option wealth and risk aversion, the employees value their opportunity to optimally decide selling (or exercising) the stock option by comparing the intrinsic value of the option with that of the European call, net of the "pro…t-performance", i.e.:
where, from (2), F 0 ¡ I is given by:
In words: if at time one the stock option is exercised the employee pays the strike price plus the "cost of the e¤ort" i.e. K + I 1 . If the stock option goes unexercised, the employee pays only I 1 . With early exercise allowed, equation (14) gives the price of the stock option only if it is larger than S 0 ¡ K: Otherwise, the price f 0 is given by the intrinsic value of the option, S 0 ¡ K.
Nontradability implies that the employees have no right to sell their option before time one and, therefore, rules out the exercise of (13) at time zero: The employees are constrained to hold the option up to time one and pay K + I 1 to exercise it or I 1 to leave it. If employees are to accept this "conditionality", introduced by shareholders to get I 1 ; it must be 6 :
6 Option nontradability implies nontradable stocks for employees. With simple adaptations of (9) we evaluate nontradability for outside investors. If the company stock cannot be traded, the short position in the above portfolio (9) requires an extra payment. Otherwise no rational investor holds the long position. To go long in the company asset a 7 or, after substituting (9), we can rewrite (18) in term of I 1 as a function of the strike price K 7 :
This is no end of the story. To induce employees to perform I 1 we need a further participation condition, i.e.: f 0¸0 : Within the admissable interval for the nontradable option expressed by (18), this constraint requires:
or rearranging terms 8 :
risk-adjusted rate of return is required that equals the market expected rate of return, i.e. that of outside investors on an equivalent-risk traded security. The di¤erence between the equilibrium rate of return on a similar …nancial security and the company asset's actual return is analogous to a (constant) dividend yield rate ±. Since a proportional dividend yield rate provides a portfolio return ±NS 0 , in a risk neutral world, the asset must yield an expected return equal to r ¡ ±: Hence, equation (11) becomes:
where:p
The term on the r.h.s. of (17) is the cost of the asset nontradability (McDonald and Siegel, 1984) .
u¡d it is easy to show that 1 + r ¡ pu > 0
8 If the risk-free probability p is known, the value of stock option F0 ½ = p(S + 1 ¡ K) de…nes a linear compensation scheme where the exercise price K may be seen as an index of performance which allows the …rm to meet the employees' "reservation wage" at the "pro…t-performance" value I 1 (See Murphy, 2001 ).
Inequalities (19) and (21) give rise to an admissible region (portrayed in Figure 1 by the area ABC) for (K; I 1 ) wherein the employees participate and accept a nontradable option. Notice that, as long as S 0 ¡ K > 0 (i.e. the stock option is issued in the money), the biting constraint is (19) and the maximum value of the "pro…t-performance", the shareholders can obtain, is I 1 < p(uS 0 ¡ K) or, valued at time zero, I 0 < F 0 : While, if S 0 ¡ K · 0 (i.e. the stock option is issued out of the money or just at the current price), the biting constraint is (21) and the maximum bene…t for shareholders is I 1 = p(uS 0 ¡ K) or, valued at time zero, I 0 = F 0 :
We sum up the above statements in two results. In the …rst we go through the opportunity cost while in the second we provide a simple rational explanation of why usually stock options are granted either out of money or at the current price.
Result 1 If we rule out risk aversion and non option wealth, the maximum value of the e¤ort-incentive shareholders may get from employees is equal to the value of the European call option sold to outside investors.
In other words, for all K 2 [S 0 ; uS 0 ] the opportunity cost for shareholders of the stock option is always equal to the best foregone alternative, i.e.: selling to outside investors, or
Result 2 If the stock option is granted in the money, the employees' participation constraint requires a lower value of the incentive-e¤ort that goes to shareholders. For all K 2 [dS 0 ; S 0 ) there is a di¤erence between the opportunity cost and what shareholders get. This di¤erence is negative, i.e. ¢ ¤¤ ¡ ¢ ¤ < 0 (as Hall and Murphy, 2000 maintain).
Finally an additional observation can be added. If we assume employees' risk aversion, the area ABC, where Result 1 holds, shrinks. On the contrary, if we introduce non option wealth the e¤ect of risk aversion is smaller and the area ABC, in which Result 1 holds, gets larger.
An example where the compensation mechansim changes the distribution of S:
So far we have described an incentive scheme that is neutral for the employees: the value of "pro…t-performance" I 1 shifts to the left the shareholders' wealth without altering the shape of S. This e¤ect is only partially appriopriable by the employees through the incentive and partecipation constraints. Actual stock option schemes are often designed to let the employees change the distribution of pro…ts and get the additional value as a compensation. In a very simple model we show what happens when the employees are able to change the distribution of S in (1) in the following way:
where u 0´® u > u > 1; with ® > 1: Moreover, to simplify the example, we add d = 1 u and r = 0. Notice that (22) shows that the employees boost the positive value of the asset, i.e. with probability q the asset may go up to S 0+ 1 = u 0 S 0 : Yet in the downturn the asset value is the same as before 9 .
9 If employees a¤ect u 0 > u they alter the trend of the asset value, without changing probabilities. A similar result may be obtained if we assume that employees are able to in ‡uence probability q 0 > q; while leaving unchanged the trend u:
11
In (22) the downside value of the asset does not change. Then the shareholders' portfolio (6) and (7) do not change. The two constraints for employees, (19) and (21), become:
and:
By substituting 10 for p;
we get:
10 It is easy to show that:
As long as the term (K ¡ dS 0 )ª(®) is positive we are able to substitute the new inequalities (25) and (26) to the old ones. This is done in Figure 2 below. 
Direct inspection of …gure 2 shows that the admissable region where employees partecipate and accept the nontradable option is now given by the 13 area AB 0 C 0 C which is greater than ABC: Therefore, considering the …rst-oder approximation of the di¤erential d(¢ ¤¤ ¡ ¢ ¤ ) around r = 0; we get 11 :
Result 3 In both inequalities (25 and 26) the term (K ¡dS 0 )ª(®) > 0; goes to zero as ® ! 1: Therefore:
² if the stock option is granted out of the money or at the current price K 2 [S 0 ; u 0 S 0 ]; the maximum value of the e¤ort shareholders may obtain from employees is larger than the value of the European call sold to outside investors. In other words, for dr > 0; the opportunity cost of granting the option (the value of the best alternative) is lower than the bene…t shareholders get, i.e.:
² if the stock option is granted in the money, there exists an interval of K 2 (S 
Conclusions
We have shown that the opportunity cost of granting non tradable options is not equal to the price of a corresponding tradable option. Non tradability puts a wedge between the option granted to employees and the corresponding option sold to outside investors. Non tradability of stock option granted to employees …nds its rationale in the incentive that options are meant to provide. If we consider the employees' e¤ort we may have that the opportunity cost of non tradable stock options is 11 Having assumed r = 0; we consider the …rst-oder approximation of the di¤erential of ¢ ¤¤ ¡ ¢ ¤ around zero, i.e.:
14 either larger or smaller than the price of the corresponding tradable option. This adds a rationale to the di¤erent exercise prices adopted by …rms granting stock options. In particular it explains why options are mostly granted either out of the money or at the current price. 
